Algorithm Design for Agents which Participate in Multiple Simultaneous Auctions
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce III, Current Issues in Agent-Based Electronic Commerce Systems (includes revised papers from AMEC 2000 Workshop)
A principled study of the design tradeoffs for autonomous trading agents
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Bidding optimally in concurrent second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Towards agents participating in realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Generating Bayes-Nash equilibria to design autonomous trading agents
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Online auctions have become a popular method for business transactions The variety of different auction rules, restrictions in supply or demand, and the agents' combinatorial preferences for sets of goods, mean that realistic scenarios are very complex Using game theory, we design trading strategies for participating in a single auction or group of similar auctions A number of concerns need to be considered in order to account for all the relevant features of real-world auctions; these include: budget constraints, uncertainty in the value of the desired goods, the auction reserve prices, the bidders' attitudes towards risk, purchasing multiple units, competition and spitefulness between bidders, the existence of multiple sources for each good To design a realistic agent, it is necessary to analyze the multi-unit auctions in which a combination of these issues are present together and we have made significant progress towards this goal Furthermore, we use a principled methodology, utilizing empirical evaluation, to combine these results into the design of agents capable of bidding in the general real-world scenarios.