AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Bayes-Nash equilibria for mth price auctions with multiple closing times
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Bidding optimally in concurrent second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Outperforming the competition in multi-unit sealed bid auctions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bidding strategies for realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Designing bidding strategies in sequential auctions for risk averse agents
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Advances in Agent-mediated Automated Negotiations
Designing trading agents for real-world auctions
SETN'10 Proceedings of the 6th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories, models and applications
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When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of these issues have been examined individually for single-unit sealed-bid auctions. However, here, we work towards extending this analysis to the multi-unit case, and also analyzing the multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in which a combination of these issues are present. In this paper, we present the initial results of this work. More specifically, we present the equilibria that exist in multi-unit sealed-bid auctions, when either the agents can have any risk attitude, or the auction has a reserve price.