Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Information Systems Frontiers
Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Bidding under uncertainty: theory and experiments
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Bidding agents for online auctions with hidden bids
Machine Learning
Bidding optimally in concurrent second-price auctions of perfectly substitutable goods
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Can priced options solve the exposure problem in sequential auctions?
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
An interactive platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Towards agents participating in realistic multi-unit sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Repeated auctions with complementarities
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
An options-based method to solve the composability problem in sequential auctions
AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
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Designing efficient bidding strategies for sequential auctions represents an important, open problem area in agent-mediated electronic markets. In existing literature, a variety of bidding strategies have been proposed and have been shown to perform with varying degrees of efficiency. However, most of strategies proposed so far do not explicitly model bidders' attitudes towards risk which, in mainstream economic literature, is considered an essential attribute in modeling agent preferences and decision making under uncertainty. This paper studies the effect that risk profiles (modeled through the standard Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure), have on the bidders' strategies in sequential auctions. First, the sequential decision process involved in bidding is modeled as a Markov Decision Process. Then, the effect that a bidder's risk aversion has on her decision theoretic optimal bidding policy is analyzed, for a category of expectations of future price distributions. This analysis is performed separately for the case of first price and second-price sequential auctions. Next, the bidding strategies developed above are simulated, in order to study the effect that an agent's risk aversion has on the chances of winning a set of complementary-valued items. The paper concludes with an experimental study of how the presence of risk-averse bidders affects both bidder profits and auctioneer revenue, for different market scenarios of increasing complexity.