Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for combinatorial coalition formation and payoff division in an electronic marketplace
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Partial-revelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
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It is a common behavior that a group of rational agents cooperate together as a bidder/seller to bid in an auction. How to determine the group bidding price and how to share the profit among the members in a group has been problems that are not studied thoroughly. In time-critical auctions, the problem is getting more complicated since the group has to decide new bidding prices within time limits. Conventional approaches used a centralized mechanism to assign profit share to each bidding agent in the group that usually lead to negative profit of individual bidding agent. We propose a distributed approach called Z-process that allows individual bidding agents to declare their compromised profit share based on their rationalities, and determines the group bidding prices simultaneously. We show that in Z-process there exists a dominant strategy for rational agents that can let them obtain maximum profit. We can also show that the compromised profit of each individual bidding agent by Z-process satisfies each agent’s rationality.