Communication complexity
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Some complexity questions related to distributive computing(Preliminary Report)
STOC '79 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Regret-based incremental partial revelation mechanisms
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mechanism design with partial revelation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
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We consider the communication complexity of implementing a given decision rule when the protocol must also calculate payments to motivate the agents to be honest in an ex post equilibrium (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasi-linear in such payments). We find that the communication cost of selfishness when measured with the average-case communication complexity may be arbitrarily large. For the worst-case communication complexity measure, we provide an exponential upper bound on the communication cost of selfishness. Whether this bound is ever achieved remains an open question. We examine several special cases in which the communication cost of selfishness proves to be very low. These include cases where we want to implement efficiency or where we have only two agents, and the precision of agents' utilities is fixed.