Practical voting rules with partial information
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A formal argumentation framework for deliberation dialogues
ArgMAS'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems
Aggregating dependency graphs into voting agendas in multi-issue elections
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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Preferences are not always expressible via complete inear orders: sometimes it is more natural to allow for the presence of incomparable outcomes. This may hold both in the agents' preference ordering and in the social order. In this article, we consider this scenario and study what properties it may have. In particular, we show that, despite the added expressivity and ability to resolve conflicts provided by incomparability, classical impossibility results (such as Arrow's theorem, Muller–Satterthwaite's theorem and Gibbard–Satterthwaite's theorem) still hold. We also prove some possibility results, generalizing Sen's theorem for majority voting. To prove these results, we define new notions of unanimity, monotonicity, dictator, triple-wise value-restriction and strategy-proofness, which are suitable and natural generalizations of the classical ones for complete orders.