Communications of the ACM
Hard and soft constraints for reasoning about qualitative conditional preferences
Journal of Heuristics
The complexity of Kemeny elections
Theoretical Computer Science
mCP nets: representing and reasoning with preferences of multiple agents
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An Efficient Procedure for Collective Decision-making with CP-nets
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Majority-rule-based preference aggregation on multi-attribute domains with CP-nets
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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We consider a framework for preference aggregation on multiple binary issues, where agents' preferences are represented by (possibly cyclic) CP-nets. We focus on the majority aggregation of the individual CP-nets, which is the CP-net where the direction of each edge of the hypercube is decided according to the majority rule. First we focus on hypercube Condorcet winners (HCWs); in particular, we show that, assuming a uniform distribution for the CP-nets, the probability that there exists at least one HCWis at least 1-1/e, and the expected number of HCWs is 1. Our experimental results confirm these results. We also show experimental results under the Impartial Culture assumption. We then generalize a few tournament solutions to select winners from (weighted) majoritarian CP-nets, namely Copeland, maximin, and Kemeny. For each of these, we address some social choice theoretic and computational issues.