When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In social choice settings with strict preferences, random dictatorship rules were characterized by Gibbard [1977] as the only randomized social choice functions that satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. In the more general domain with indifferences, RSD (random serial dictatorship) rules are the well-known and perhaps only known generalization of random dictatorship. We present a new generalization of random dictatorship for indifferences called Maximal Recursive (MR) rule as an alternative to RSD. We show that MR is polynomial-time computable, weakly strategyproof with respect to stochastic dominance, and, in some respects, outperforms RSD on efficiency.