Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
When do noisy votes reveal the truth?
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty about the voters' preferences. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of (coalitional) manipulation for the setting where there is uncertainty about the voting rule: the manipulator(s) know that the election will be conducted using a voting rule from a given list, and need to select their votes so as to succeed no matter which voting rule will eventually be chosen. We identify a large class of voting rules such that arbitrary combinations of rules from this class are easy to manipulate; in particular, we show that this is the case for single-voter manipulation and essentially all easy-to-manipulate voting rules, and for coalitional manipulation and k-approval. While a combination of a hard-to-manipulate rule with an easy-to-manipulate one is usually hard to manipulate---we prove this in the context of coalitional manipulation for several combinations of prominent voting rules---we also provide counterexamples showing that this is not always the case.