Two forms of dependence in propositional logic: controllability and definability
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
On strongest neccessary and weakest sufficient conditions
Artificial Intelligence
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
Artificial Intelligence
Propositional independence: formula-variable independence and forgetting
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
New polynomial classes for logic-based abduction
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Compact preference representation for boolean games
PRICAI'06 Proceedings of the 9th Pacific Rim international conference on Artificial intelligence
LPOD answer sets and nash equilibria
ASIAN'04 Proceedings of the 9th Asian Computing Science conference on Advances in Computer Science: dedicated to Jean-Louis Lassez on the Occasion of His 5th Cycle Birthday
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Deterrence and Defeasibility in Argumentation Process for ALIS Project
Computable Models of the Law
Extending Classical Planning to the Multi-agent Case: A Game-Theoretic Approach
ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Dependencies Between Players in Boolean Games
ECSQARU '07 Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Compact preference representation for boolean games
PRICAI'06 Proceedings of the 9th Pacific Rim international conference on Artificial intelligence
Weighted Boolean formula games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Designing incentives for Boolean games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The complexity of game isomorphism
Theoretical Computer Science
Manipulating boolean games through communication
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Incentive engineering for Boolean games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Towards tractable Boolean games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Incentive engineering for Boolean games
Artificial Intelligence
Taxation search in boolean games
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Strategic considerations in the design of committees
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Verifiable equilibria in boolean games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Computational Aspects of Uncertainty Profiles and Angel-Daemon Games
Theory of Computing Systems
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Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [8] are two players, zero-sum static games where players' utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player consist of truth assignments to each of a given set of propositional variables (the variables controlled by the player.) We generalize the framework to n-players games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the related problems.