Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Algorithmic Game Theory
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Information Security Game Analysis with Penalty Parameter
ISECS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
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On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
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The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A game-theoretic approach to cooperation in multi-agent systems
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Web Intelligence, Mining and Semantics
Manipulating boolean games through communication
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Towards tractable Boolean games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Incentive engineering for Boolean games
Artificial Intelligence
Join Me with the Weakest Partner, Please
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Taxation search in boolean games
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Verifiable equilibria in boolean games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Boolean games are a natural, compact, and expressive class of logic-based games, in which each player exercises unique control over some set of Boolean variables, and has some logical goal formula that it desires to be achieved. A player's strategy set is the set of all possible valuations that may be made to its variables. A player's goal formula may contain variables controlled by other agents, and in this case, it must reason strategically about how best to assign values to its variables. In the present paper, we consider the possibility of overlaying Boolean games with taxation schemes. A taxation scheme imposes a cost on every possible assignment an agent can make. By designing a taxation scheme appropriately, it is possible to perturb the preferences of the agents within a society, so that agents are rationally incentivised to choose some socially desirable equilibrium that would not otherwise be chosen, or incentivised to rule out some socially undesirable equilibria. After formally presenting the model, we explore some issues surrounding it (e.g., the complexity of finding a taxation scheme that implements some socially desirable outcome), and then discuss possible desirable properties of taxation schemes.