Deterrence and Defeasibility in Argumentation Process for ALIS Project

Authors:
Michel Rudnianski;Hélène Bestougeff
Affiliations:
ORT France, Paris, France 75116;ORT France, Paris, France 75116
Venue:
Computable Models of the Law
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Argumentation issues, which are of core importance to ALIS, are addressed through a particular category of qualitative games called Games of Deterrence. The graphs associated with those games are interpreted as sets of inferences sequences between statements in the framework of non-monotonic logic. Thus an argumentation process is interpreted as a game of deterrence, which resolution determines the truth or falsity of statements, and the possible argumentation strategies of the parties.