Multi-agent systems reliability, fuzziness, and deterrence

Authors:
Michel Rudnianski;Hélène Bestougeff
Affiliations:
University of Reims, Paris, France;CODATA – Boulevard Montmorency, Paris, France
Venue:
FAABS'04 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Approaches to Agent-Based Systems
Year:
2004

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Abstract

The problem of MAS reliability is approached through representing the functioning of a MAS as a system of logical implications, and then interpreting this system as a game of deterrence. The game solutions provide indicators for the agent's reliability, and enable in case of an agent's failure, to select a search direction for determining the origin of the failure. The MAS reliability is increased by duplicating some agents. The impact of the duplicate's positioning in the MAS is analysed on a particular case.