Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model

Authors:
John Bartholdi, III;Michael A Trick
Affiliations:
School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA;School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
1986

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Abstract

We study a special case of the Stable Roommates problem in which preferences are derived from a psychological model common in social choice literature. When preferences are 'single-peaked' and 'narcissistic', there exists a unique stable matching, and it can be constructed in O(n) time. We also show how to recognize quickly, when a set of preferences is single-peaked.