A better heuristic for preemptive parallel machine scheduling with batch setup times
SIAM Journal on Computing
Preemptive scheduling with job-dependent setup times
Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Complexity and Approximation: Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Their Approximability Properties
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Performance Guarantees of Local Search for Multiprocessor Scheduling
Proceedings of the 8th International IPCO Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Lot-sizing scheduling with batch setup times
Journal of Scheduling
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Extremal Combinatorics: With Applications in Computer Science
Extremal Combinatorics: With Applications in Computer Science
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Scheduling selfish tasks: about the performance of truthful algorithms
COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
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We study multiprocessor scheduling games with setup times on identical machines. Given a set of scheduling policies (coordination mechanism) on the machines, each out of n players chooses a machine to assign his owned job to, so as to minimize his individual completion time. Each job has a processing length and is of a certain type. Same-type jobs incur a setup overhead to the machine they are assigned to. We study the Price of Anarchy with respect to the makespan of stable assignments, that are pure Nash or strong equilibria for the underlying strategic game. We study in detail the performance of a well established preemptive scheduling mechanism. In an effort to improve over its performance, we introduce a class of mechanisms with certain properties, for which we examine existence of pure Nash and strong equilibria. We identify their performance limitations, and analyze an optimum mechanism out of this class. Finally, we point out several interesting open problems.