A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimization problems in congestion control
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The chord version for SONET ADMs minimization
Theoretical Computer Science
On minimizing the number of ADMs---Tight bounds for an algorithm without preprocessing
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfishness, collusion and power of local search for the ADMs minimization problem
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A 10/7 + ε approximation for minimizing the number of ADMs in SONET rings
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Better bounds for minimizing SONET ADMs
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Grooming of arbitrary traffic in SONET/WDM BLSRs
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In the ADM minimization problem, the input is a set of arcs along a directed ring. The input arcs need to be partitioned into non-overlapping chains and cycles so as to minimize the total number of endpoints, where a k -arc cycle contributes k endpoints and a k -arc chain contains k + 1 endpoints. We study ADM minimization problem both as a non-cooperative and a cooperative games. In these games, each arc corresponds to a player, and the players share the cost of the ADM switches. We consider two cost allocation models, a model which was considered by Flammini et al., and a new cost allocation model, which is inspired by congestion games. We compare the price of anarchy and price of stability in the two cost allocation models, as well as the strong price of anarchy and the strong price of stability.