Review: logical mechanism design

Authors:
Iyad Rahwan;Kate Larson
Affiliations:
Computing &/ information science program, masdar institute of science &/ technology, abu dhabi, uae and the media lab, massachusetts institute of technology, cambridge, 02139 ma, usa/ e-mail ...;Cheriton school of computer science, university of waterloo, waterloo, on, n2l 3g1, canada/ e-mail: klarson@cs.uwaterloo.ca
Venue:
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Game theory is becoming central to the design and analysis of computational mechanisms in which multiple entities interact strategically. The tools of mechanism design are used extensively to engineer incentives for truth revelation into resource allocation (e.g. combinatorial auctions) and preference aggregation protocols (e.g. voting). We argue that mechanism design can also be useful in the design of logical inference procedures. In particular, it can help us understand and engineer inference procedures when knowledge is distributed among self-interested agents. We set a research agenda for this emerging area, and point to some early research efforts.