On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Complexity of the minimum base game on matroids
Mathematics of Operations Research
Algorithms: design techniques and analysis
Algorithms: design techniques and analysis
Understanding Terror Networks
Network Analysis: Methodological Foundations (Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
Network Analysis: Methodological Foundations (Lecture Notes in Computer Science)
VLDB '06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Very large data bases
A randomized method for the shapley value for the voting game
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
Computers and Operations Research
Combinatorial Optimization: Theory and Algorithms
Combinatorial Optimization: Theory and Algorithms
Power Indices in Spanning Connectivity Games
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Efficient computation of the shapley value for centrality in networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Inetlligence and Machine Learning)
On coalition formation with sparse synergies
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A new approach to betweenness centrality based on the Shapley Value
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
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We study a recently developed centrality metric to identify key players in terrorist organisations due to Lindelauf et al. [2013]. This metric, which involves computation of the Shapley value for connectivity games on graphs proposed by Amer and Gimenez [2004], was shown to produce substantially better results than previously used standard centralities. In this paper, we present the first computational analysis of this class of coalitional games, and propose two algorithms for computing Lindelauf et al.'s centrality metric. Our first algorithm is exact, and runs in time linear by number of connected subgraphs in the network. As shown in the numerical simulations, our algorithm identifies key players in the WTC 9/11 terrorist network, constructed of 36 members and 125 links, in less than 40 minutes. In contrast, a general-purpose Shapley value algorithm would require weeks to solve this problem. Our second algorithm is approximate and can be used to study much larger networks.