On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
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In this paper we develop a polynomial method based on sampling theory that can be used to estimate the Shapley value (or any semivalue) for cooperative games. Besides analyzing the complexity problem, we examine some desirable statistical properties of the proposed approach and provide some computational results.