Verification of Safety Properties Using IntegerProgramming: Beyond the State Equation
Formal Methods in System Design
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions
Bidding languages and winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions for supply chain management
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Computationally-efficient winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A test suite for the evaluation of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Journal of Algorithms
BIDFLOW: a New Graph-Based Bidding Language for Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Generalised Network Flows for Combinatorial Auctions
WI-IAT '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Exclusivity-based allocation of knowledge
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents offering goods and services, and in general MMUCAs extend and generalise several types of combinatorial auctions. Here we provide a formalism, based on an extension of Petri Nets, with which MMUCAs, and therefore all auction types subsumed by MMUCAs --- and in particular combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation (SCF)---, can be formally analysed. As a second direct benefit, consequence of the provided mapping to Petri Nets, we manage to dramatically reduce the number of decision variables involved in the optimisation problem posed by MMUCAs from quadratic to linear for a wide class of MMUCA Winner Determination Problems (WDPs). Hence, we also make headway in the practical application of MMUCAs, and in particular to SCF.