On Satisfiability Games and the Power of Congestion Games

Authors:
Vittorio Bilò
Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Matematica "Ennio De Giorgi", Università del Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano, P.O. Box 193, 73100 Lecce, Italy
Venue:
AAIM '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We introduce and study satisfiability games, a new class of games that can be seen as the non-cooperative version of classical maximum satisfiability problems. We give several results involving these games and mainly focus on their expressiveness. In particular, we show that there exists a strong correspondence between satisfiability games and congestion games. As one of the consequences of our results, we show that each game is isomorphic to a congestion game with player specific payoffs. Thus, each other game can be defined as a particular specialization of congestion games with player specific payoffs and this paper can be considered as a first effort in outlining a classification of non-cooperative games.