Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On Satisfiability Games and the Power of Congestion Games
AAIM '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
A unified approach to congestion games and two-sided markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
SIAM Journal on Computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for various combinatorial optimization problems in such systems. First, we investigate the distributed caching and a general set of assignment problems. We develop an almost tight LP-based 1 - 1e - ε-approximation algorithm and a local search ½ - ε-approximation algorithm for these problems. We also design efficient decentralized mechanisms for these problems and study the convergence of the corresponding games. In the following chapters, we study the speed of convergence to high quality solutions on (random) best-response paths of players. First, we study the average social value on best response paths in basic-utility, market sharing, and cut games. Then, we introduce the sink equilibrium as a new equilibrium concept. We argue that, unlike Nash equilibria, the selfish behavior of players converges to sink equilibria and all strategic games have a sink equilibrium. To illustrate the use of this new concept, we study the social value of sink equilibria in weighted selfish routing (or weighted congestion) games and valid-utility (or submodular-utility) games. In these games, we bound the average social value on random best-response paths for sink equilibria. Finally, we study cross-monotonic cost sharings and group-strategyproof mechanisms. We study the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including set cover and metric facility location. We develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight bounds for these games. At the end, we extend some of these results to group-strategyproof mechanisms. (Copies available exclusively from MIT Libraries, Rm. 14-0551, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Ph. 617-253-5668; Fax 617-253-1690.)