The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
Mathematics of Operations Research
Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 5th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tight approximation algorithms for maximum general assignment problems
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents
Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents
Fast and compact: a simple class of congestion games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Pure nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Artificial Intelligence
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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Congestion games are a well-studied model for resource sharing among uncoordinated selfish agents. Usually, one assumes that the resources in a congestion game do not have any preferences over the players that can allocate them. In typical load balancing applications, however, different jobs can have different priorities, and jobs with higher priorities get, for example, larger shares of the processor time. We introduce a model in which each resource can assign priorities to the players and players with higher priorities can displace players with lower priorities. Our model does not only extend standard congestion games, but it can also be seen as a model of two-sided markets with ties. We prove that singleton congestion games with priorities are potential games, and we show that every player-specific singleton congestion game with priorities possesses a pure Nash equilibrium that can be found in polynomial time. Finally, we extend our results to matroid congestion games, in which the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the resources.