The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
Mathematics of Operations Research
Smoothed analysis of algorithms: Why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A unified approach to congestion games and two-sided markets
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
The stable roommates problem with globally-ranked pairs
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Upper bounds for stabilization in acyclic preference-based systems
SSS'07 Proceedings of the 9h international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
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Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided matching markets. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings, introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is well known that stable matchings can be computed in polynomial time, but many real-life markets lack a central authority to match agents. In those markets, matchings are formed by actions of selfinterested agents, whose behavior is often modeled by Nash dynamics such as best and better response dynamics. In this note, we summarize recent results on Nash dynamics in two-sided markets.