The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
NP-complete stable matching problems
Journal of Algorithms
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
Journal of Algorithms
Faster scaling algorithms for general graph matching problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Hard variants of stable marriage
Theoretical Computer Science
The stable roommates problem with ties
Journal of Algorithms
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An O(v|v| c |E|) algoithm for finding maximum matching in general graphs
SFCS '80 Proceedings of the 21st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient algorithms for weighted rank-maximal matchings and related problems
ISAAC'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
The integral stable allocation problem on graphs
Discrete Optimization
On the social welfare of mechanisms for repeated batch matching
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
On finding better friends in social networks
SSS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked globally. In contrast to the unrestricted problem, weakly stable matchings are guaranteed to exist, and additionally, can be found in polynomial time. However, it is still the case that strongly stable matchings may not exist, and so we consider the complexity of finding weakly stable matchings with various desirable properties. In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to find a rank-maximal (weakly stable) matching. This is the first generalization of the algorithm due to Irving et al. [18] to a non-bipartite setting. Also, we prove several hardness results in an even more restricted setting for each of the problems of finding weakly stable matchings that are of maximum size, are egalitarian, have minimum regret, and admit the minimum number of weakly blocking pairs.