The small-world phenomenon: an algorithmic perspective
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with incomplete information
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
When Ignorance Helps: Graphical Multicast Cost Sharing Games
MFCS '08 Proceedings of the 33rd international symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
Spatial spectrum access game: nash equilibria and distributed learning
Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM international symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
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We introduce a new general framework for the analysis of non cooperative games with limited social knowledge. Such an incomplete knowledge is modeled by means of a social graph G in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j, with the assumption that the payoff of each player is affected only by the strategies of the adjacent ones. In particular, we consider congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other ones. We first give a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria, and then investigate the impact of the limited knowledge of the players on the performance of the game, in terms of price of anarchy and price of stability.