Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fast convergence of selfish rerouting
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic Game Theory
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Dynamic inefficiency: anarchy without stability
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs
Journal of Scheduling
Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We consider resource allocation games with heterogeneous users and identical resources. Most of the previous work considered cost structures with either negative or positive congestion effects. We study a cost structure that encompasses both the resource's load and the job's share in the resource's activation cost. We consider the proportional sharing rule, where the resource's activation cost is shared among its users proportionally to their lengths. We also challenge the assumption regarding the existence of a fixed set of resources, and consider settings with an unlimited supply of resources. We provide results with respect to equilibrium existence, computation, convergence and quality. We show that if the resource's activation cost is shared equally among its users, a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) might not exist. In contrast, under the proportional sharing rule, a pure NE always exists, and can be computed in polynomial time. Yet, starting at an arbitrary profile of actions, best-response dynamics might not converge to a NE. Finally, we prove that the price of anarchy is unbounded and the price of stability is between 18/17 and 5/4.