Transitions in geometric minimum spanning trees
Discrete & Computational Geometry - Special issue on ACM symposium on computational geometry, North Conway
Wireless information networks
On the Complexity of Computing Minimum Energy Consumption Broadcast Subgraphs
STACS '01 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: combining MSTs with shortest-path trees
PE-WASUN '04 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international workshop on Performance evaluation of wireless ad hoc, sensor, and ubiquitous networks
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
On nash equilibria for multicast transmissions in ad-hoc wireless networks
ISAAC'04 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
On a locally minimum cost forwarding game
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international workshop on Foundations of wireless ad hoc and sensor networking and computing
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Ad-hoc networks are an emerging networking technology, in which the nodes form a network with no fixed infrastructure: each node forwards messages to the others by using the wireless links induced by their power levels. Generally, energy-efficient protocols heavily rely on cooperation. In this paper, we analyze from a game-theoretic point of view the problem of performing a broadcast operation from a given station s. We show both theoretical and experimental results on how the existence of (good) Nash equilibria is determined by factors such as the transmission power of the stations or the payment policy that stations can use to enforce their reciprocal cooperation.