Stackelberg scheduling strategies
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How unfair is optimal routing?
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: Second Order Nash equilibria
Theoretical Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science
Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Non-cooperative games on multidimensional resource allocation
Future Generation Computer Systems
A note on a selfish bin packing problem
Journal of Global Optimization
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In the non cooperative version of the classical Minimum Bin Packing problem, an item is charged a cost according to the percentage of the used bin space it requires. We study the game induced by the selfish behavior of the items which are interested in being packed in one of the bins so as to minimize their cost. We prove that such a game always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium starting from any initial packing of the items, estimate the number of steps needed to reach one such equilibrium, prove the hardness of computing good equilibria and give an upper and a lower bound for the price of anarchy of the game. Then, we consider a multidimensional extension of the problem in which each item can require to be packed in more than just one bin. Unfortunately, we show that in such a case the induced game may not admit a pure Nash equilibrium even under particular restrictions. The study of these games finds applications in the analysis of the bandwidth cost sharing problem in non cooperative networks.