Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Selfish traffic allocation for server farms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Selfish routing
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Structure and complexity of extreme Nash equilibria
Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
Theoretical Computer Science
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction
Information Processing Letters
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the packing of selfish items
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
On nash equilibria in non-cooperative all-optical networks
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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Motivated by the increasing interest of the Computer Science community in the study and understanding of non-cooperative systems, we present a novel model for formalizing the rational behavior of agents with a more farsighted view of the consequences of their actions. This approach yields a framework creating new equilibria, which we call Second Order equilibria, starting from a ground set of traditional ones. By applying our approach to pure Nash equilibria, we define the set of Second Order pure Nash equilibria and present their applications to the Prisoner's Dilemma game, to an instance of Braess's Paradox in the Wardrop model and to the KP model with identical machines.