Bin Packing of Selfish Items

  • Authors:
  • Guosong Yu;Guochuan Zhang

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Mathematics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China 310027 and Department of Mathematics, Nanchang University, Nanchang, China 330031;Department of Mathematics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China 310027 and College of Computer Science, Zhejiang University,

  • Venue:
  • WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We study a bin packing game in which any item to be packed is handled by a selfish agent. Each agent aims at minimizing his sharing cost with the other items staying in the same bin, where the social cost is the number of bins used. We first show that computing a pure Nash equilibrium can be done in polynomial time. We then prove that the price of anarchy for the game is in between 1.6416 and 1.6575, improving the previous bounds.