Using dual approximation algorithms for scheduling problems theoretical and practical results
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
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Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
On the truthfulness and the approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallel algorithms and architectures
On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
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Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
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COCOON'07 Proceedings of the 13th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
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We study the problem of assigning unsplittable traffic to a set of m links so to minimize the maximum link congestion (i.e., the makespan). We consider the case of selfish agents owning pieces of the traffic. In particular, we introduce a variant of the model by Koutsopias and Papadimitriou [1999] in which owners of the traffic cannot directly choose which link to use; instead, the assignment is performed by a scheduler. The agents can manipulate the scheduler by reporting falseinformation regarding the size of each piece of unsplittable traffic.We provide upper and ower bounds on the approximation achievable by mechanisms that induce a Nash equilibrium when all agents report their true values.For the case of each agent owning one job, our positive results for m identical links show the effectiveness of introducing such a scheduler since, in this case, (1+ε)-approximate solutions are guaranteed in polynomial time. In contrast, the result by Koutsopias and Papadimitriou [1999] shows that, without payments and allowing selfish routing, Nash equilibria yield (in the worst case) Ω(log m over log log m)-approximate solutions, even for unitary weighted traffic. When links have different speeds we prove lower and upper bounds on the approximation achievable by a mechanism inducing a Nash equilibrium.Similar approximability results for identical machines have been achieved by Feldman et al. [2003]. However these results do not hold in our setting because their model assumes that the algorithm is provided with the correct traffic weights. For the case of agents owning more than one job, we give mechanisms that achieve constant approximation and prove lower bounds on the approximation ratio that can be achieved by a mechanism.