Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Distributed Learning of Wardrop Equilibria
UC '08 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Unconventional Computing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We show that tolls that are linear in the latency of the maximum latency path are necessary and sufficient to induce heterogeneous network users to independently choose routes that lead to traffic with minimum average latency. This improves upon the earlier bound of O(n3lmax) given by Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden in STOC 03. (Here, n is the number of nodes in the network; and lmax is the maximum latency of any edge.) Our proof is also simpler, relating the Nash flow to the optimal flow as flows rather than cuts.We model the set of users as the set [0, 1] ordered by their increasing willingness to pay tolls to reduce latency--their valuation of time. Cole et al. give an algorithm that computes optimal tolls for a bounded number of agent valuations, under the very strong assumption that they know which path each user type takes in the Nash flow imposed by these (unknown) tolls. We show that in series parallel graphs, the set of paths traveled by users in any Nash flow with optimal tolls is independent of the distribution of valuations of time of the users. In particular, for any continuum of users (not restricted to a finite number of valuation classes) in series parallel graphs, we show how to compute these paths without knowing α.We give a simple example to demonstrate that if the graph is not series parallel, then the set of paths traveled by users in the Nash flow depends critically on the distribution of users' valuations of time.