Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for selfish users with elastic demands

Authors:
George Karakostas;Stavros G. Kolliopoulos
Affiliations:
Department of Computing and Software, McMaster University;Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of Athens
Venue:
COCOON'06 Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Year:
2006

Citing 7
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Abstract

We examine how to induce selfish heterogeneous users in a multicommodity network to reach an equilibrium that minimizes the social cost. In the absence of centralized coordination, we use the classical method of imposing appropriate taxes (tolls) on the edges of the network. We significantly generalize previous work [20,13,9] by allowing user demands to be elastic. In this setting the demand of a user is not fixed a priori but it is a function of the routing cost experienced, a most natural assumption in traffic and data networks.