Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands
Operations Research Letters
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A crowding game is a noncooperative game in which the payoff of each player depends only on the player's action and the size of the set of players choosing that particular action: The larger the set, the smaller the payoff. Finite,n-player crowding games often have multiple equilibria. However, a large crowding game generically has just one equilibrium, and the equilibrium payoffs in such a game are always unique. Moreover, the sets of equilibria of them-replicas of a finite crowding game generically converge to a singleton asm tends to infinity. This singleton consists of the unique equilibrium of the "limit" large crowding game. This equilibrium generically has the following graph-theoretic property: The bipartite graph, in which each player in the original, finite crowding game is joined with all best-response actions for (copies of ) that player, does not contain cycles.