Braess's paradox in large random graphs
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing Multimodal Freight Transport Networks: A Heuristic Approach and Applications
Transportation Science
Models of Non-atomic Congestion Games --- From Unicast to Multicast Routing
Algorithmics of Large and Complex Networks
Braess's paradox for flows over time
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Road traffic optimisation using an evolutionary game
Proceedings of the 13th annual conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation
Optimal sub-networks in traffic assignment problem and the Braess paradox
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Monotonicity properties of user equilibrium policies for parallel batch systems
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
A comparison of a communication strategies in cooperative learning
Proceedings of the 14th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
Random Structures & Algorithms
Avoid fixed pricing: consume less, earn more, make clients happy
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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For each point of a road network, let there be given the number of cars starting from it, and the destination of the cars. Under these conditions one wishes to estimate the distribution of traffic flow. Whether one street is preferable to another depends not only on the quality of the road, but also on the density of the flow. If every driver takes the path that looks most favorable to him, the resultant running times need not be minimal. Furthermore, it is indicated by an example that an extension of the road network may cause a redistribution of the traffic that results in longer individual running times.