Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in games with finitely many players

Authors:
Uriel G. Rothblum
Affiliations:
Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This paper derives bounds on the gap between optimal performance and the performance of Nash equilibria in n-person games with continuous action sets. Specific interesting expressions are obtained for the average efficiency per player in congestion games.