A utility-based power-control scheme in wireless cellular systems
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A scalable model for channel access protocols in multihop ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
Transmission Costs, Selfish Nodes, and Protocol Design
WIOPT '05 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
A general model of wireless interference
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
On the Access Pricing and Network Scaling Issues of Wireless Mesh Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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We consider the problem of joint usage of a shared wireless channel in a an interference-bound environment, and focus on a distributed setting where there is no central entity managing the various transmissions. In such systems, unlike other multiple access environments, several transmissions may succeed simultaneously, depending on spatial interferences between the different stations. We use a game theoretic view to model the problem, where the stations are selfish agents aiming at maximizing their success probability. We show that when interferences are homogeneous, system performance suffers an exponential degradation in performance at an equilibrium, due to the selfishness of the stations. However, when using a proper penalization scheme for aggressive stations, we can ensure the system's performance value is at least 1/e of the optimal value, while still being at equilibrium.