Transmission Costs, Selfish Nodes, and Protocol Design

Authors:
Peter Marbach;Ran Pang
Affiliations:
University of Toronto;University of Toronto
Venue:
WIOPT '05 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We study how selfish nodes react to transmission costs in wireless networks. Intuitively, it seems that transmission costs should have a stabilizing effect as (rational) nodes will defer packet transmissions when congestion develops and the cost for (successfully) transmitting a packet becomes high. In this paper we investigate whether this intuition is true. We use slotted Aloha to model the communication channel.