Slotted Aloha as a game with partial information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Transmission Costs, Selfish Nodes, and Protocol Design
WIOPT '05 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
On the throughput, capacity, and stability regions of random multiple access
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) - Special issue on networking and information theory
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
A game-theoretic look at simple relay channel
Wireless Networks
Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on Security of Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
A game-theoretic look at throughput and stability in random access
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
Stability of N interacting queues in random-access systems
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Stability and delay of finite-user slotted ALOHA with multipacket reception
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On Joint MAC and Network Coding in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Game theory and the design of self-configuring, adaptive wireless networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Game theoretic resistance to denial of service attacks using hidden difficulty puzzles
ISPEC'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
A Security Differential Game Model for Sensor Networks in Context of the Internet of Things
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
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In wireless access, transmitter nodes need to make individual decisions for distributed operation and do not necessarily cooperate with each other. We consider a single-receiver random access system of non-cooperative transmitters with the individual objectives of optimizing their throughput rewards, transmission energy costs and delay costs. The non-cooperative transmitter behavior may be purely selfish or may also reflect malicious objectives of generating interference to prevent the successful transmissions of the other nodes as a form of denial of service attack. Our goal is to evaluate the interactions between selfish and malicious nodes that have the dual objectives of optimizing their individual performance measures and blocking the packet transmissions of the other selfish nodes. We assume saturated packet queues of infinite buffer capacities and consider a general multi-packet reception channel that allows packet captures in the presence of simultaneous transmissions. In this context, we formulate a non-cooperative random access game of selecting the individual probabilities of transmitting packets to a common receiver. We derive the non-cooperative transmission strategies in Nash equilibrium. The analysis provides insights for the optimal strategies to block random access of selfish nodes as well as the optimal defense mechanisms against the possible denial of service attacks of malicious nodes in wireless networks. The results are also compared with the cooperative equilibrium strategies that optimize the total system utility (separately under random access and scheduled access). A pricing scheme is presented to improve the non-cooperative operation. For distributed implementation, we formulate a repeated game of the best-response strategy updates and introduce adaptive heuristics (based on the channel feedback only) provided that the system parameters are not explicitly known at the individual transmitters.