A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks

  • Authors:
  • Yu Liu;Cristina Comaniciu;Hong Man

  • Affiliations:
  • Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ;Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ;Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ

  • Venue:
  • GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In wireless ad hoc networks, although defense strategies such as intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can be deployed at each mobile node, significant constraints are imposed in terms of the energy expenditure of such systems. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework to analyze the interactions between pairs of attacking/defending nodes using a Bayesian formulation. We study the achievable Nash equilibrium for the attacker/defender game in both static and dynamic scenarios. The dynamic Bayesian game is a more realistic model, since it allows the defender to consistently update his belief on his opponent's maliciousness as the game evolves. A new Bayesian hybrid detection approach is suggested for the defender, in which a lightweight monitoring system is used to estimate his opponent's actions, and a heavyweight monitoring system acts as a last resort of defense. We show that the dynamic game produces energy-efficient monitoring strategies for the defender, while improving the overall hybrid detection power.