A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Aggregating Bandwidth for Multihomed Mobile Collaborative Communities
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Modelling misbehaviour in ad hoc networks: a game theoretic approach for intrusion detection
International Journal of Security and Networks
Modeling misbehavior in cooperative diversity: a dynamic game approach
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing - Special issue on game theory in signal processing and communications
On the effectiveness of cooperation in carrier sense-based ad hoc networks
SECON'09 Proceedings of the 6th Annual IEEE communications society conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks
The lightweight currency and file share in geography-aware ad hoc networks
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Optimal relay-subset selection and time-allocation in decode-and-forward cooperative networks
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Optimal relay-subset selection and time-allocation in decode-and-forward cooperative networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Detection of selfish nodes in networks using CoopMAC protocol with ARQ
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
The cost of using cooperation in a wireless network
Asilomar'09 Proceedings of the 43rd Asilomar conference on Signals, systems and computers
Sequential detection of misbehaving nodes in cooperative networks with HARQ
MILCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Military communications
Connectivity in selfish, cooperative networks
IEEE Communications Letters
Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Packet forwarding strategies for cooperation enforcement in mobile ad hoc wireless networks
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Security Through Collaboration and Trust in MANETs
Mobile Networks and Applications
An incentive-based forwarding protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with anonymous packets
NEW2AN'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Next Generation Teletraffic and Wired/Wireless Advanced Networking
Safeguarding ad hoc networks with a self-organized membership control system
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Cross-layer metrics for reliable routing in wireless mesh networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands
Theory of Computing Systems
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In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes communicate with far off destinations using intermediate nodes as relays. Since wireless nodes are energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay requests. On the other hand, if all nodes decide not to expend energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios (complete cooperation and complete noncooperation) are inimical to the interests of a user. In this paper, we address the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks. We assume that nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by self interest, and that each node is associated with a minimum lifetime constraint. Given these lifetime constraints and the assumption of rational behavior, we are able to determine the optimal share of service that each node should receive. We define this to be the rational Pareto optimal operating point. We then propose a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm called Generous TIT-FOR-TAT (GTFT). The acceptance algorithm is used by the nodes to decide whether to accept or reject a relay request. We show that GTFT results in a Nash equilibrium and prove that the system converges to the rational and optimal operating point.