Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Why does it pay to be selfish in a MANET?
IEEE Wireless Communications
An analytical approach to the study of cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Charging support for ad hoc stub networks
Computer Communications
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In self-organized ad hoc networks, all networking functions rely on the contribution of the relay nodes. Since nodes are energy constrained, nodes may not wish to relay packets for other nodes, hence leading to a drop in network throughput. In this paper, we address the issue of enforcement of cooperative behavior in network nodes. A number of approaches based either on credit or on reputation mechanisms have been proposed in the literature but these have been found to be largely unsatisfactory in the context of mobile ad hoc networks. A game theoretic approach to the solution to the cooperation problem that relies on rational and selfish behavior of network nodes may be more effective. This paper aims at determining conditions under which, such cooperation without external incentives can exist. We have focused on the packet forwarding function of the nodes and proposed a game theoretic model for achieving cooperation. Our simulation results show that cooperation is enforced in network based on a suitable strategy function under a wide range of parameters like strategies, initial condition of nodes, energy cost for sending or forwarding packets, traffic rate, noise effect, mobility, etc.