Stimulating cooperation in route discovery of ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on QoS and security for wireless and mobile networks
Protocols for mobility management in heterogeneous multi-hop wireless networks
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Impact of a simple load balancing approach and an incentive-based scheme on MANET performance
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
A game theory approach to selection diversity in wireless ad-hoc networks
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
A game theoretical approach to distributed relay selection in randomized cooperation
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
IEEE Transactions on Communications
Packet forwarding strategies for cooperation enforcement in mobile ad hoc wireless networks
ICDCIT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Internet Technology
Connectivity restoration in delay-tolerant sensor networks using game theory
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing
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Routing protocols for a mobile ad hoc network have assumed that all mobile nodes voluntarily participate in forwarding others' packets. This was a reasonable assumption because all MNs in a MANET belonged to a single authority. In the near future, however, a MANET may consist of MNs that belong to many different organizations since numerous civilian applications are expected to crop up. In this situation, some MNs may run independently and purposely decide not to forward packets so as to save their own energy. This could potentially lead to network partitioning and corresponding performance degradation. To minimize such situations in MANETs, many studies have explored the use of both the carrot and the stick approaches by having reputation-based, credit-payment, and game theory schemes. This article summarizes existing schemes, identifies their relative advantages, and projects future directions