Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks: a market-based approach
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
An analytical approach to the study of cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) station acts both as a source packet generator and transit packet forwarder. With selfish stations and the absence of administrative cooperation enforcement, the lack of forwarding incentives has long been recognized as a serious design problem in MANETs. Reputation systems discourage selfishness by having past cooperation increase the present source packet throughput. We describe a simple watchdog-controlled first-hand reputation system and point to a form of selfishness not addressed by existing research, arising from packet anonymity. If the watchdog at a station cannot tell a nearby station's source packets from transit packets, that station is tempted to admit more source packet traffic than a fair local admittance control (LAC) scheme permits. We analyze a related noncooperative LAC game and characterize three types of its Nash equilibria. Next we propose a simple packet forwarding protocol by the name Decline and Force (D&F) and using an approximate performance model show that, when properly configured, D&F leads to a fair and efficient game outcome.