Discrete-event simulation
Collaborative Intrusion Detection System (CIDS): A Framework for Accurate and Efficient IDS
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Convex Optimization
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
A Trust-Aware, P2P-Based Overlay for Intrusion Detection
DEXA '06 Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Database and Expert Systems Applications
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
HIDS: Honesty-Rate Based Collaborative Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
CISIM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 7th Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management Applications
Robust and scalable trust management for collaborative intrusion detection
IM'09 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP/IEEE international conference on Symposium on Integrated Network Management
Game theory meets network security and privacy
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSs) work in isolation and may be easily compromised by new threats. An intrusion detection network (IDN) is a collaborative IDS network intended to overcome this weakness by allowing IDS peers to share collective knowledge and experience, hence improve the overall accuracy of intrusion assessment. In this work, we design an incentive model based on trust management by using game theory for peers to collaborate truthfully without free-riding in an IDN environment. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under which peers can communicate in an incentive compatible manner. Using duality of the problem, we develop an iterative algorithm that converges geometrically to the equilibrium. Our numerical experiments and discrete event simulation demonstrate the convergence to the Nash equilibrium and the incentives of the resource allocation design.