Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Intrusion Detection in Sensor Networks: A Non-Cooperative Game Approach
NCA '04 Proceedings of the Network Computing and Applications, Third IEEE International Symposium
Modelling incentives for collaboration in mobile ad hoc networks
Performance Evaluation - Selected papers from the first workshop on modeling and optimization in mobile, ad hoc and wireless networks (WiOpt'2003)
Incentive-based modeling and inference of attacker intent, objectives, and strategies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
OURS: optimal unicast routing systems in non-cooperative wireless networks
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Achieving cooperation in multihop wireless networks of selfish nodes
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
DARWIN: distributed and adaptive reputation mechanism for wireless ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Hidden information and actions in multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Signaling game based strategy of intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
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In this paper, we use game theory to study the interactions between a malicious node and a regular node in wireless networks with unreliable channels. Since the malicious nodes do not reveal their identities to others, it is crucial for the regular nodes to detect them through monitoring and observation. We model the malicious node detection process as a Bayesian game with imperfect information and show that a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (also a sequential equilibrium) is attainable. While the equilibrium in the detection game ensures the identification of the malicious nodes, we argue that it might not be profitable to isolate the malicious nodes upon detection. As a matter of fact, malicious nodes and regular nodes can co-exist as long as the destruction they bring is less than the contribution they make. To show how we can utilize the malicious nodes, a post-detection game between the malicious and regular nodes is formalized. Solution to this game shows the existence of a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium and the conditions that achieve the equilibrium. Simulation results and their discussions are also provided to illustrate the properties of the derived equilibria.