Wireless sensor networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Detection of Denial-of-Message Attacks on Sensor Network Broadcasts
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Bayesian Game Approach for Preventing DoS Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks
CMC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 WRI International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing - Volume 03
A Game Theory Approach to Detect Malicious Nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks
SENSORCOMM '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Third International Conference on Sensor Technologies and Applications
Coexistence with malicious nodes: a game theoretic approach
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Attack and flee: game-theory-based analysis on interactions among nodes in MANETs
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
P2P soft security: On evolutionary dynamics of P2P incentive mechanism
Computer Communications
DTRAB: combating against attacks on encrypted protocols through traffic-feature analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Node clustering in wireless sensor networks: recent developments and deployment challenges
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Review: Intrusion detection system: A comprehensive review
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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As Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) become increasingly popular, it is necessary to require Intrusion Detection System (IDS) available to detect internal malicious sensor nodes. Because sensor nodes have limited capabilities in terms of their computation, communication, and energy, selecting the profitable detection strategy for lowering resources consumption determines whether the IDS can be used practically. In this paper, we adopt the distributed-centralized network in which each sensor node has equipped an IDS agent, but only the IDS agent resided in the Cluster Head (CH) with sufficient energy will launch. Then, we apply the signaling game to construct an Intrusion Detection Game modeling the interactions between a malicious sensor node and a CH-IDS agent, and seek its equilibriums for the optimal detection strategy. We illustrate the stage Intrusion Detection Game at an individual time slot in aspects of its player's utilities, pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) and mixed-strategy BNE. Under these BNEs the CH-IDS agent is not always on the Defend strategy, as a result, the power of CH can be saved. As the game evolves, we develop the stage Intrusion Detection Game into a multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game in which, based on Bayesian rules, the beliefs on the malicious sensor node can be updated. Upon the current belief and the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), the best response strategy for the CH-IDS agent can be gained. Afterward, we propose an intrusion detection mechanism and corresponding algorithm. We also study the properties of the multi-stage dynamic Intrusion Detection Game by simulations. The simulation results have shown the effectiveness of the proposed game, thus, the CH-IDS agents are able to select their optimal strategies to defend the malicious sensor nodes' Attack action.