Stochastic games for security in networks with interdependent nodes

Authors:
Kien C. Nguyen;Tansu Alpcan;Tamer Basar
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL;Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Berlin, Germany;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL
Venue:
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Year:
2009

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Survivability evaluation towards attacked WSNs based on stochastic game and continuous-time Markov chain

Applied Soft Computing
Game theory meets network security and privacy

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Abstract

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose security assets and vulnerabilities are correlated. Such a network can be modeled using weighted directed graphs with the edges representing the influence among the nodes. The game can be formulated as a non-cooperative zero-sum or nonzero-sum stochastic game. However, due to correlation among the nodes, if some nodes are compromised, the effective security assets and vulnerabilities of the remaining ones will not stay the same in general, which leads to complex system dynamics. We examine existence, uniqueness, and structure of the solution and also provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.