Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Designing the Market Game for a Trading Agent Competition
IEEE Internet Computing
Journal of Computer Security - IFIP 2000
Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making
IEEE Security and Privacy
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
Information Systems Research
Testing social theories in computer-mediated communication through gaming and simulation
Simulation and Gaming - Symposium: Artifact assessment versus theory testing
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Conditioning Prices on Purchase History
Marketing Science
Botz-4-sale: surviving organized DDoS attacks that mimic flash crowds
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Anti-Phishing Phil: the design and evaluation of a game that teaches people not to fall for phish
Proceedings of the 3rd symposium on Usable privacy and security
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Predicted and observed user behavior in the weakest-link security game
UPSEC'08 Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology, and Security
Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on Firm Stock Price
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
When information improves information security
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Network security games: combining game theory, behavioral economics, and network measurements
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Modeling internet security investments: tackling topological information uncertainty
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
A game-theoretic approach to content-adaptive steganography
IH'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding
Security adoption and influence of cyber-insurance markets in heterogeneous networks
Performance Evaluation
Journal of Computer Security
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A common assumption in security research is that more individual expertise unambiguously leads to a more secure overall network. We present a game-theoretic model in which this common assumption does not hold. Our findings indicate that expert users can be not only invaluable contributors, but also free-riders, defectors, and narcissistic opportunists. A direct application is that user education needs to highlight the cooperative nature of security, and foster the community sense, in particular, of higher skilled computer users. As a technical contribution, this paper represents, to our knowledge, the first formal study to quantitatively assess the impact of different degrees of information security expertise on the overall security of a network.